Qualia problem

Qualia problem. Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem. Dec 27, 2008 · Over the past few decades, many philosophers of the mind have pointed out the glaring logical problems with materialism as an adequate solution to the mind-body problem. To elaborate, the “gap” entails the lack of a scientific explanation for the subjective aspects of consciousness and how it feels for one to experience the physical aspects of the world. Suppose you take a sip of orange juice. REFERENCES [1] Frank Jackson, 'Epiphenomenal Qualia', Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982) 127-36. The term qualia derives from the Latin neuter plural form ( qualia) of the Latin adjective quālis ( Latin pronunciation: [ˈkʷaːlɪs The problem of accounting for qualia has thus become known, following Chalmers, as the hard problem of consciousness. Wie kann man naturwissenschaftlich ergründen, in welchem Verhältnis neuronale Zustände zu Qualia stehen? Qualia science will resolve the core problem in duality, the vexed relationship between mind and body. "wie sich Oct 25, 2015 · The definition of qualia is strong, but there have been questions as to whether it is strong enough to draw a line between functionalists and dualists or not. And the discussion about qualia really got rolling in the 60s and 70s, especially Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem. 在哲学中，感质（英語： Qualia ， / ˈ k w ɑː l i ə / 或 / ˈ k w eɪ l i ə / ；单数形式：Quale）的定义是主觀 意识经验的獨立存在性和唯一性。 Qualia这个词源自拉丁语中的形容词quālis'（拉丁語發音： [ˈkʷaːlɪs] ）的中性复数形式，意为“of what sort”或“of what kind”（大致意为“…性”，例如红色性 The Hard Problem of Consciousness. This essay proposes a protocol that may point in the right direction. 5. Qualia are at the heart of the "what it's like to be" character of conscious experience, as elucidated by Thomas Nagel in 1974 [97]. Perhaps you mean something along these lines? "Qualia" is a philosophical term of art used to refer to subjective experience. May 31, 2023 · Again, images and their color qualia are EM substances laid out in neural maps. turing of qualia according to stratified categories of likeness and difference (e. The problem of qualia R. ‘taste’[1984]). 4. The next chapter (Chapter 4: Theorem III) will examine and determine whether qualia are physical phenomena, and the subsequent chapter (Chapter 5: Theorem IV) will investigate and find the nature of qualia and answer the hard problem of qualia, the explanatory gap, and other related questions. Yet others (notably Jackson) used to believe in qualia but have changed their mind. I argue that if "absent qualia" or "inverted qualia", are possible, then phenomena I call "fading qualia" and "dancing qualia" will be possible; but I argue that it is very implausible that fading or dancing qualia are possible. Inverted qualia. [1] It invites us to imagine that we wake up one morning, and find that for some unknown reason all the colors in the world have been inverted, i. The Qualia Problem by Frank Jackson (1982) … I am what is sometimes known as a “qualia freak. For if qualitative states could be functionally defined, the fact that mental states have qualitative character would provide no problem for functionalism. Block believes qualia to be so obviously real and familiar that, invoking Louis The second argument has broader scope and is more powerful, demonstrating that if absent qualia or inverted qualia are possible, then a phenomenon involving what I will call Dancing Qualia is possible; but I will argue that we have even better reason to believe that Dancing Qualia are impossible. It is in the field called the philosophy of psychology, or philosophy of mind. The entry that follows is divided into ten sections. swapped to the hue on the opposite side of a color wheel, the complementary color. The knowledge argument (also known as Mary's Room or Mary the super-scientist) is a philosophical thought experiment proposed by Frank Jackson in his article "Epiphenomenal Qualia" (1982) and extended in "What Mary Didn't Know" (1986). Interviewed by Lou A similar problem was also addressed earlier in the 12th century by Ibn Tufail (Abubacer), in his philosophical novel, Hayy ibn Yaqdhan (Philosophus Autodidactus). ” The problem that Locke posed is often called the “inverted-spectrum” problem, though “inverted-qualia” problem might be more philosophically correct (Byrne, 2014). I. Jun 1, 2023 · 1 The qualia problem is related to but di erent than the problem of memory (how are memories encoded, stored and retrieved), because memories could . Qualia sind die Empfindungskategorien, die nur subjektiv zugänglich sind, zum Beispiel Farb-, Geschmacks- oder Schmerzempfindungen. Qualia and phenomenal information 9 1. Feb 26, 2022 · Qualia stellen nun deswegen ein Problem dar, weil es keinen Konsens hinsichtlich deren ontologischen Status gibt. Since qualia are what create the trouble for the physicalism and since Dennett is a physicalist, one can understand why Dennett targets qualia and tries to We would like to show you a description here but the site won’t allow us. After all, the information messages we call qualia are inner representations. Feb 16, 2018 · At the centre of Frank Jackson’s articulation of the Qualia Problem is the claim that “one can have all the physical information without having all the information there is to have”. Our folk psychology tells us qualia are those inherently subjective ‘raw feels’ such as pain and the experience of seeing ‘red’. , Chalmers and Strawson) try to attack the problem directly, taking experience as primitive or fun-damental. Yet there is clearly something not quite right about this. A. Oyelakin Department of Philosophy, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria. . A different sort of problem for functionalism is posed by cases in which two creatures are functionally identical, and each have qualia, but have different qualia. 7. He defines Transparency in different ways, depending on whether we’re talking about veridical experience, illusion, or hallucination; the differences concern the positive claims about which properties we are aware of, and can attend to, in experience. Mar 8, 2005 · 1. Jan 1, 1996 · PDF | One issue that has been raised time and again in philosophy of mind and more recently in cognitive science is the question of qualia, or "raw | Find, read and cite all the research you Jul 22, 2022 · Chalmers (2017) coined the term the “hard problem” to describe the gap in understanding the conversion of the physical world to qualia. Leibniz hat das Leib-Seele-Problem, das sich mit dem Begriff der Qualia näher beschreiben lässt, seinerseits mit dem Begriff der petites perceptions zu erfassen versucht. 3) in the following ways. Block believes qualia to be so obviously real and familiar that, invoking Louis Mar 11, 2024 · Rather than thinking of qualia as a binary property that a system either has or lacks, it may be more productive to consider a spectrum or continuum of qualia, with different types of systems Qualia are what are supposed to create problems for the physicalist since it doesn’t seem that that purely qualitative feels could be nothing more than the buzzing of neurons in the brain. The singular is “quale” (pronounced ‘KWA-lay’). 3 Numbers and Abstracta. In philosophy of mind, qualia ( / ˈkwɑːliə, ˈkweɪ -/; sg. The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why any physical state is conscious rather than nonconscious. Jun 17, 2020 · The guiding line is the key Wittgensteinian insight of his Private Language Argument, namely the claim that no inner perception of qualia can justify our corresponding qualia-beliefs. Thus (assuming the pos-sibility of qualia inversion) there will be one class of mental states, Jul 29, 2014 · The qualia problem is definitely real but it’s not as crazy as you might think – there are ways of showing that we see colors similarly, because we can objectively tell which ones are light and dark and we know which ones mix to form others. 2 (1985 Apr 21, 2017 · The ability to identify representations as representations is at the core of the problem of the origin of qualia. Zombies and illusionism 15 1. Someone might object to the preceding argument on the grounds that I have misconstrued the problem about qualia. [7] [8] Modern science may now have the tools necessary to test this problem in controlled environments. Mary in the room with no pain 6 1. 5, §2. Personally, I believe the only reason why functionalists have any problem with qualia is the cases where they overstep and state something like "I can explain what you think 'red' is. Feb 13, 2001 · As Chalmers notes (1996; p. Qualia is the Latin word for the plural of “quale” to describe the subjective or the qualitative property of experience. Next in line is comprehending the particular way that a specific quale feels. The existence of qualia is a problem for cognitive science and philosophy of mind because it seems that our subjective sensations of experience only exist within the mind. A proponent of Lycan’s view could however respond along the following lines: In The word “qualia” is plural. Jun 11, 2020 · 8. 2 A second dimension is the organization of objective structures (such as houses and calendars) that in turn structure experience by ‘generative schemes’ (1977). 1 Trotzdem gibt es keinen klaren Konsens, was Qualia sein sollen; 2 auch nicht hinsichtlich dessen, was (noch) als Quale gilt, und was nicht. A third problem, which we mentioned briefly above, is the problem of abstracta (Rabin 2020). One reason qualia have so fascinated philosophers is that they are arguably hard to explain in standard scientific terms. Qualia cannot be fully described, com- Wolfgang Fasching argues that the hard problem is not about qualia, but about the what-it-is-like-ness of experience in Nagel's sense—about the givenness of phenomenal contents: Today there is a strong tendency to simply equate consciousness with the qualia. Why does red feel the way it does, which is very different from blue? Colors are not abstract, arbitrary symbols: they represent something Jan 18, 1999 · In a 2006 paper, Michael Pauen has given a particularly persuasive argument that offers a new and deeper twist to the problem of what epiphenomenalists can consistently claim to know about qualia. The entry that follows is divided into eight sections. Proponents of qualia claim that no physical theory of mind can explain the qualitative character of subjective experience because qualia are not reducible to the physical properties of the mind. in theory be encoded without qualia. there can be cases of 'inverted qualia'. [2] Examples of qualia include the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Thus philosophical disputes about qualia For instance, while Chalmers (1996) notes the easy problems of explaining consciousness involve discriminating mental states, the hard problem of consciousness is explaining why conscious states are experienced as they are -- in short, the hard problem of consciousness is the explanation of qualia. Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem One reason qualia have so fascinated philosophers is that they are arguably hard to explain in standard scientific terms. Smart posed the challenge this way in a 1959 article: Consider a sensation like a yellowy-orange after-image. In the case of sensory experience, for example, while all sorts of comprehensive data could be recorded in a said event, there is yet Aug 20, 1997 · The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. These are forms of the Latin word for “what sort” or “what kind. I'm not sure what you mean by "the Qualia Problem". The so-called “hard May 25, 2017 · Understanding how qualia come about is just the first step toward eliminating the “problem” from the mind-body problem. D. S. Qualia is the leading digital real estate closing platform. Given the scientific identification of heat with the motion of molecules, there is no further Sep 3, 2002 · It has been objected by Tye (1995) that the use of the qualia name “Q” within a propositional attitude context creates the well-known problems: Replacing “Q” by another name “R” for the same quale may change the truth value of the belief ascription. there are problems with giving a precise definition of these notions, and so of the thesis of Physicalism that all (correct) information is physical informa-tion. Instead of pursuing the fruitless goal of discovering how atoms and molecules learn to think, qualia science takes consciousness as primary in the universe, not a secondary product of brain processes. Mar 31, 2015 · I think the problem of other minds is perceived similarly to a wire puzzle. , phenomenal consciousness, or mental states/events with phenomenal qualities or qualia). Das Qualiaproblem ist ein spannender Teilbereich des Leib-Seele-Problems. B. The qualia problem centers on the subjective nature of conscious experiences and challenges understanding the relationship between the mind and body. From this perspective, the most difficult challenge to the scientific explanation of consciousness is represented by the so-called “hard problem” of qualia, as opposed to the “light problems” of explaining the neuronal substrate of specific cognitive functions, such as memory, learning, and attention [117,118]. Aug 10, 2022 · Since E-space is designed to map qualia conceived of as fundamental units of experience, there is a potential problem in supposing they can be assigned subsidiary properties like pitch. It is the problem of explaining why there is “something it is like” for a subject in conscious experience, why conscious mental states “light up” and directly appear to the subject. The Problem of Qualia. Even for those generally sympathetic to functionalism, there is one category of mental states that seems particularly resistant to functional characterization. com. The first problem regards their nature or constitution. If you are not logged in to Qualia Connect, Qualia’s Support team will have to reset your 2FA settings after verifying your identity. [2] Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter, 'Causal Origin and Evidence', Theoria 51. Dieses Problem besteht darin, anzugeben, in welcher Art und Weise etwas Mentales (Seele) mit der physikalischen Welt (Leib) in Verbindung steht. Multiple realization and the problem of artificial Indeed, C. What does that mean, how can we understand the idea philosop Rorty bezweifelt die Relevanz des Qualia-Problems: Alle Erste-Person-Aspekte des Mentalen wiesen eine historische und genetische Dimension auf, sodass die Art, in der uns die Dinge heute erscheinen, nur ein Schnappschuss unserer aktuellen Subjektivität sei ohne irgendeinen natürlichen Anspruch auf epistemologische oder ontologische Jul 27, 2013 · The thesis to which Tye opposes Qualia Realism, whether strong or weak, is Transparency. Tell me Aug 20, 1997 · The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. Aug 24, 2004 · 5. Qualia (singular ‘quale’), in a common modern usage, are properties of experiences that type them in phenomenological respects. The concept of absent qualia is one of two major functionalist objections to the existence of qualia, the other being the inverted spectrum hypothesis. Since qualia are what create the trouble for the physicalism and since Dennett is a physicalist, one can understand why Dennett targets qualia and tries to Nov 22, 2019 · State-space problem (what mathematical features does each qualia variety, value, and binding architecture correspond to?) Translation problem (starting with the mathematical object corresponding to a specific experience within the correct formalism, how do you derive the phenomenal character of the experience?) We consider some of the classic qualia thought experiments and two proposed solutions to the qualia problem, eliminativism and content-dependence. The problem of qualia 6 1. In der gegenwärtigen Diskussion wird das Leib-Seele-Problem gerne in der Formulie-rung des Qualia-Problems gebracht. ,The study analyses the little that can be objectively known about qualia, and proposes a process that imitates the same effects. indirect realism, the metaphysics of consciousness, perceptual intentionality, representationalist theories of consciousness, and the transparency of Qualia is the leading digital real estate closing platform. ' Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210-1365, U. Email support@qualia. , entities 1. Ein phänomenal adäquater Qualia-Begriff stellt den Ausgangs- und Angelpunkt eines Lösungsversuches des hard problem dar, der auch hinreichend dessen Explanandum berücksichtigen will. the construct may well turn out to be In philosophy and certain models of psychology, qualia (/ˈkwɑːliə/ or /ˈkweɪliə/; singular form: quale) are claimed to be individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. (1) The hard problem: How are qualia metaphysically related to brains and computations? In NP, consciousness and its qualia Qualia are the mystery element of consciousness: the intrinsic features of conscious experience. In the contemporary philosophical theories of consciousness the concept of qualia remains a problem for any cognitive methods reducing human qualia, sometimes concede that one can speak as if qualia existed. The concept dates back to John Locke. E-mail: richyman2009@yahoo. While neither of these solutions are actually able to dismiss or explain qualia as claimed, the content-based solution does clarify the relation between cognitive science and qualia. Qualia Qualia can be described as ‘what is like to have an experience’. Qualia's cloud-based title, escrow, and closing software brings lenders, title & escrow companies, consumers, real estate agents, and all other transaction participants together into one secure platform to simplify how homes are bought and sold. 5. NP addresses the hard problem, qualia-integration problem, and qualia coding/correlation problem (see §1. 4 Inverted qualia The above cases are ones in which a functional duplicate of a creature which has states with certain qualia lacks those qualia. ”. 6. Lewis, who is generally thought to have introduced the term, used ‘qualia’ in this way, and many others (e. At first it looks and feels insoluble. Many of us have probably heard neuroscientists talking about things like synapses, neurons, and different regions of the brain. The first distinguishes various uses of the term ‘qualia’. Our Ordinary Conception of Perceptual Experience. Ultimately, we will see how qualia and the mind-body problem relate to one another and gain a deeper understanding of the various views that surround these two Qualia, the Heart of the Mind-Body Problem and EpistemologyÕs Quagmire The problem of qualia R. Then there is something that it is like for you to experience the taste of orange juice. e. The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have problem intuitions about consciousness, why we intuitively think that conscious experience cannot be scientifically explained. Jun 18, 2004 · Qualia problems in many forms—Can there be inverted qualia? (Block 1980a 1980b, Shoemaker 1981, 1982) Are qualia epiphenomenal? (Jackson 1982, Chalmers 1996) How could neural states give rise to qualia? (Levine 1983, McGinn 1991)—have loomed large in the recent past. Qualia is a philosophical term used to refer to an individual's subjective experience, that is to say, the way something feels to that individual at that particular moment. Beyond colors though it becomes a lot less certain, it’s kind of cool but scary. 2. All of the papers are interesting, and many of them make substantive contributions to ongoing debates over the structure of experience, direct vs. 1. The first person to use “qualia” in its modern sense was Clarence Irving Lewis, in 1929. Smith claims that what most authors have in mind in talking about the Problem of Perception is the “question of whether we can ever directly perceive the physical world”, where “the physical world” is understood in a realist way: as having “an existence that is not in any way dependent upon its being perceived or thought Jul 27, 2018 · In this manner, sound computational explanations of qualia and the “hard problem” of consciousness are provided in response to a lack of physical, chemical and psychological explanations. 3. Aug 20, 1997 · The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. 1 But - unlike some - I take the question of definition to cut across the central problems I want to discuss in this paper. Qualia. Dennett 1988: 229) have understood ‘qualia’ to denote properties that are ‘ineffable, intrinsic, private, and directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness’. If it were possible to provide a complete third-person description of phenomenal states, that would resolve the "what it's like to be" problem of consciousness. Das Lager der Physikalisten meint, dass Qualia nichts anderes als physikalische Eigenschaften des Gehirns sind (z. Many theorists have noted great differences between our intuitive conceptions of qualia and those of typical physical properties such as mass or length, and have asked whether qualia could nonetheless be identical with physical properties. The term qualia derives from the Latin neuter plural form (qualia) of the Latin adjective quālis (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkʷaːlɪs]) meaning “of what sort” or “of what kind” in a specific instance […] Nov 27, 2009 · The problem of inverted qualia goes back to John Locke, who asked us to imagine a situation in which we wake up one day and — without any physical change having occurred in the world or in our These thought-experiments involve the gradual replacement of neurons by silicon chips, and similar scenarios. This concerns the status within physicalism of abstract objects, i. Smart, 1959), und das Lager der Dualisten hingegen meint, dass Qualia fundamental mentale Eigenschaften des physikalischen Gehirns (z. One can nd three Nov 22, 2019 · State-space problem (what mathematical features does each qualia variety, value, and binding architecture correspond to?) Translation problem (starting with the mathematical object corresponding to a specific experience within the correct formalism, how do you derive the phenomenal character of the experience?) We consider some of the classic qualia thought experiments and two proposed solutions to the qualia problem, eliminativism and content-dependence. 24), echoing Chomsky’s famous distinction, the intentionality issue is a problem, but the qualia issue is a mystery. Qualia as real concrete processes 17 1. A metatheoretical problem, which I deal with, is the ontological status of qualia – namely whether they are reducible to physical properties. Pauen’s focus is on the epiphenomenalists’ claim that there are laws linking the occurrence of neural events of certain kinds with occurrences of Feb 27, 2018 · Qualia are the modes of experiencing the external objects or internal states from “the first person perspective”. " Nov 10, 2004 · 1. After a while, though, many suspect that the problem can be solved. Imagine seeing three colored patches against a neutral background in good light, one after the other. Qualia are part of the phenomenon of the subjectivity of consciousness, and pose one of the most difficult problems for a materialist solution to the mind-body problem. It could have some flaws as it is currently formulated, so I’m open to refinements of any kind. g. C. Central to the evidence against materialism is the concept of qualia. In philosophical literature, this particular experience is often described as the experience of “what it’s like to be a bat”—in which the bat’s point of view can be replaced by any other animal. Identity Theory J. Access consciousness and cognitive qualia 11 1. The "redness" of red is a commonly used example of a quale. An odor quale is an inner representation of the structure of a volatile molecule words \image" and \qualia" are interchangeable { and they should be (nearly), but to my knowledge there are virtually no discussions about qualia in terms of \explaining the origin of the image" in consciousness studies. I am what is sometimes known as a "qualia freak". I think Oct 21, 2011 · The hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995) is the problem of explaining the relationship between physical phenomena, such as brain processes, and experience (i. The correspondence problem and methodological dualism 23 1. Dec 16, 2016 · Pingback: A Big State-Space of Consciousness | Qualia Computing; Pingback: Glossary of Qualia Research Institute Terms | Qualia Computing; Pingback: Psychedelic Turk: A Platform for People on Altered States of Consciousness | Qualia Computing; Pingback: Thoughts on the ‘Is-Ought Problem’ from a Qualia Realist Point of View | Qualia Computing Mar 13, 2016 · I am only learning about qualia, but from my point of view, qualia seem to pose a methodological problem as far as qualitative and quantitative research is concerned. Chalmers, 1996) bzw a general overview of qualia, the mind-body problem, and the various solutions philosophical schools o " er. Qualia refers to the subjective qualities of conscious experiences, such as the taste of chocolate or the feeling of pain, which are inherently private and accessible only to the individual Qualia is the technical name for the subjective aspects of experiences like “violet” or “sweet” or “itch. If you are a nominalist, and if qualia are properties, then you must be an opponent of real qualia, on pain of inconsistency. 1 Phänomenale Inadäquatheit des herkömmlichen Qualia-Begriffs. J. Our support team will set up a video call with the account holder to verify their identity using a valid government-issued photo ID such as a passport or driver In der Philosophie des Geistes nimmt das Leib-Seele-Problem eine zentrale Rolle ein. Others (e. A color quale is an inner representation of the hue of light detected. ” I think that there are certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical information includes. Of course (a) and (d) are not the only claims that the qualia realist makes about qualia;Keep in mind that qualia is a philosophical construct whose purpose is largely to stimulate thought and discussion about subjective experience, definitions, and potential empirical implications. Jun 19, 2009 · The Case for Qualia is a collection of nineteen new papers on topics in the philosophy of mind. or else join the ranks of physicalism in the hope that the qualia problem will find a happy resolution. There is The second addresses the question of which mental states have qualia. A. According to the traditional view, qualia are characterised as being: (1) ineffable (2) intrinsic (3) private Qualia is the leading digital real estate closing platform. Accepted 16 March 2009 The paper intends to research into the mind-body problem and examine an aspect of the current issue in the debate. The solution to this problem is to treat each point in E-space as representing a single quale, and the subsidiary “properties” as labels that define the Sep 5, 2022 · that there are qualia, then go on to propound only a psychological theory, hoping that the qualia problem will get settled as a by-product. com to start the process. On the other hand, physicalists argue that mental states are brain states and brain states are physical states. Nagel spricht hier das sogenannte Qualia-Problem an. His version of the problem, however, dealt mainly with colors rather than shapes. T. 5 Functionalism and the Problem of Qualia. From this perspective, the problem of qualia – although not always named Qualia [1] is a term philosophers use for bits of perception or subjective, conscious experience. Eine weitere frühe Formulierung des Qualiaproblems geht auf den Physiologen Emil du Bois-Reymond und seine Ignorabimusrede zurück. Mit "Qualia" sind die subjektiven Erlebnisgehalte mentaler Zustände (bzw. If the arguments succeed, we have good reason to Qualia are what are supposed to create problems for the physicalist since it doesn’t seem that that purely qualitative feels could be nothing more than the buzzing of neurons in the brain. My main goal is not to use the hypothesis of Crick and Koch for developing another philosophical argument for the possibility of structural analysis of qualia, but to present their neurobiological theory as an actual hypothetical structural description of qualia: a description which is very coarse and by large part speculative, but which would But this is impossible if, as Jackson (1982) suggests, epiphenomenalism is true: on epiphenomenalism, qualia are causally inefficacious; so, how can qualia produce an increase in knowledge? So, Jackson cannot consistently maintain both epiphenomenalism and the learning claim. In this respect, I analyse Chalmers’ zombie argument against this sort of reduction and materialists’ replicas. Jan 5, 2020 · Philosopher Daniel Dennett explains how his functionalist perspective can shed some light on the apparent mystery of conscious experience. Qualia (singular quale) is a philosophical term that refers to the subjective aspect of sensory experience. In most academic debates it is atly ignored that this is how the qualia problem should be characterized. : quale /- li /) are defined as instances of subjective, conscious experience. The hard problem of consciousness relates quite closely to what Joseph Levine had previously referred to as the explanatory gap. As for various sensations of "red" (for example), I think the visual sense can be sharpened/trained just as one can develop a understand of higher mathematics by rigorous study. uyhuaj xzthlji kmx lod gmhx hfg urgb naxa exodr ipizy